Epistemic battle over scale-freeness

See this article on the epistemic divide on the issue of scale-freeness in network science.  It explores the "tension between" two views on the topic that might find syntegrity in a shared "trading zone," ideas I've explored in this article and elsewhere. 

However, the scientific method requires that theory, when tested and empirical results do not validate it, must change in accord with the results. It seems to me that some theorists though refuse to budge on their predetermined theories and instead try to invalidate the results. It's true that some experimental designs might be themselves biased with a pre-determined result in mind. But when the experimental design is improved and agreed upon by consensus and the results still contradict the theory, then the fault lies with the theorists.

This seems to be what's going on in this epistemic divide over scale-freeness. The nomothetics refuse to accept the ideographics statistical methodology, while the latter refuse to accept the former axioms based on their methodological results. The thing is though that the ideographics have created a metanarrative big picture to account for the results. It is not just focused on local results of particular experiments. And that 'universal' metatheory is as noted in my paper, i.e. the cognitive science of how we perceive and conceive which allows for a plurality of lenses that are nonetheless syntegrated via that theory and method. But again, the nomothetics refuse to even acknowledge it. Or if they do, attempt to invalidate it by using their biased premises as given in a circular argument. And worse, if you don't accept their a priori premises then you *must* be engaging in relativistic postmodernism, even though the cogsci aforementioned also critique that very thing while providing universals!