Mark Edwards: An Integral Metatheory

I'm copying and pasting this FB IPS post on his book, as it is being blocked due to a forbidden link: 

"In general, theorists rely on only a small number of conceptual lenses in developing their explanations of organisational transformation. This means that, for example, process theorists ignore structural lenses, such as those used by multilevel theorists, and developmental theorists make very little use of the transition process or learning lenses. Theorists who come from a standpoint or relational perspective often neglect the developmental and multilevel lenses and those lenses expressed as bipolar dualisms. In fact, the extensive list of lenses in Table 7.1 suggests that most theorists are relying on a relatively limited conceptual base in developing explanations for transformational occurrences. This exclusionism has several unfortunate implications for theories of transformation in organisational settings" (134).

A similar sentiment from Lakoff from a metaphoric angle: 

 

"The science and the social sciences all use causal theories, but the metaphors for causation can vary widely and thus so can the kinds of causal inferences you can draw. Again, there is nothing wrong with this. You just have to realize that causation is not just one thing. There are many kinds of modes of causation, each with different logical inferences, that physical, social, and cognitive scientists attribute to reality using different metaphors for causation. Again, it is important to know which metaphor for causation you are using. Science cannot be done without metaphors of all sorts, starting with a choice of metaphors for causation. Most interestingly, if you look at the history of philosophy, you will find a considerable number of "theories of causation." When we looked closely at the philosophical theories of causation over the centuries, they all turned out to be one or another of our commonplace metaphors for causation. What philosophers have done is to pick their favorite metaphor for causation and put it forth as an eternal truth."

 

From the Intro to the Spirituality Lens (184):

 

"The spirituality lens, because of its multiparadigm nature, can be used to consider sustainability from a number of conceptual orientations. These include: (i) spirituality as an advanced stage of sustainability, (ii) spirituality as a ubiquitous process that underlies all sustainable relationships and (iii) spirituality as an integrative rather than merely growth-focused endeavour."

 

E.g., from section iii:

 

"A spirituality lens that is more concerned with integration moves our attention away from the growth-based explanations of change and technological innovation towards integrative conceptualisations of sustainability. Hence, the particular interest in agricultural sustainability, urban gardens, simpler lifestyles and in forms of organisational sustainability that make use of such things as biomimicry and substituting biological systems for man-made technological systems" (187).

Now Edwards admits that he's using the holonic lens as a 'scaffold' to accommodate all the lenses (189). That lens is the container schema according to cogsci. And it has its own premises and inferences that apply to that schema, but it is only one of dozens of schemas. So I question that the holonic lens can truly provide a syntegrative scaffold for all the other lenses. Lakoff et al. certainly do not use the container schema to do that with the other schemas.

 

Which brings me to our Ning discussion of Latour. Here's Latour commenting on Souriau referring to the different modes of existence, akin to lenses and schema:

 

"Let us therefore reject any temptation to structure or hierarchize the [multiple] modes by explaining them dialectically. You will always fail to know existence in itself if you deprive it of the arbitrariness that is one of its absolutes" (316).

 

“In the last section of the work, Souriau in fact applies himself to the problem of how the modes are enchained…. In order to avoid this continual exaggeration, to allow the modes to ‘keep their distance’, to mutually respect their different types of verification, we have to define yet another mode (one of the ‘second degree’ as he says) and which is defined this time by the movement and the variation or modulation of one mode into another: this is what he calls the plurimodal. Only they can make the superimposition of the ‘traces’ finally ‘compossible’, and give metaphysics the amplitude that it should have…. But now it is variation itself that has to be considered equivalent to true beings. Alterity alters yet another degree. Difference differs even more differently" (330-31).

 

Latour is talking about using prepositions to understand existence. He gets this from Wm. James and Souriau, this notion that prepositions are "neither an ontological domain, nor a region, territory, sphere, or material." They are that which "prepares the position...to what follows" (308-9). Looking at the definition of preposition we find that they "typically express a spatial, temporal, or other relationship." Well, well, our image schema again. And per Latour this prepositional approach heals the subject/object split, for it paves the way or prepares the position taken by any particular suobject in its autonomy. It's akin to our old friend khora in that way, as a pregnant womb that prepares for the birth of, or sets the stage for, duality.

 

From this (edited) Ning post:*

 

So our basic categories are embodied with image schemas that arise from our interactions with the world. Recall that one of the image schemas is the part-whole gestalt, aka mereology. Since image schemas and basic categories operate below conscious attention we’ve come to assume that they are inherent to the world themselves and thus project this notion of 'natural hierarchy, with its most developed forms in Aristotelian abstract, nested, categorical hierarchies. All of which assumes a basic, particular and inherent 'constituent' as foundation at the bottom and/or a general and inherent 'being' as foundation at the top. Meanwhile the process actually begins in the middle of the classical taxonomy and we get more abstractly specific 'downward' and more general 'upward' from there with a useful but constructed hierarchy. This doesn’t necessarily eliminate hierarchy per se, just contextualizes it is a more naturalistic way and only eliminates its dualistic and metaphysical elements, elements which have some form of inclusivism and hegemony at its core. The notion of holons as involutionary givens is one of those metaphysical elements, and as we’ve seen this is much better explained by the part-whole gestalt properties of the container schema.

 

And this* post discussing how Hartshorne uses relative and absolute terms, the latter asymmetrically dependent on the former:

 

Another way of approaching r/a terms is through basic categories and image schema. Recall that these prototypes are in the middle of classical categorical hierarchies, between the most general and the most particular. Basic categories are the most concrete way we have of relating to and operating within the environment. Thus both the more particular and more general categories are more abstract. And yet our usual way of thinking is that the more particular the category the more concrete or relative the object it represents is and vice versa.

 

Which is indeed related to the a-terms being asymmetrically dependent on the r-terms, if by r-terms we mean those concrete image schema which are the basis of more abstract derivations. It's easy to confuse them because our 'common sense' associates the more concrete objects of the world with the most particular objects on our constructed hierarchies; the same for the most abstract and emphemeral of thoughts, which do not seem physical or material. And yet these hierarchies are not constructed that way, instead being from the middle up and down via image schema and basic categories.

 

Such things are unconscious and not readily apparent. So of course we can 'reason' from both the bottom-up and top-down in such hierarchies if we associate the r-terms with the most particular and the a-terms with the most general or abstract. But we do so from the most concrete of image schema, the actual r-terms, while the top and bottom of the usual, classical hierarchy are the most abstract.

 

From this* Ning post discussing Bryant's diagram** and using more accurate images based on cogsci than the ladder or its extension in nested circles or spheres. Such images have a profound effect on our philosophies.

 

So in terms of hier(an)archy, the 'object a' as embodied image schema 'in the middle' is the networked interactions of the particular and the general. It appears as a hole or absence in such diagrams but it's not nothing. Like Emptiness it is the transcendental interrelations of dependent origination, not some outside or transcendent force and ground. This doesn't negate hierarchy per se, just contextualizes it with the middle ground as that which transcendentalizes the apparent transcendent and abstract top/bottom on a vertical ladder via formal, metaphysical reason. The top/bottom curve back on themselves, infolding back into the middle, while the middle curves out to enfold and relate the top/bottom. Hier(an)archy indeed.

 

And this from Edwards et al. in Integral Review:*

 

"For a tensegrity-oriented approach the centre is a virtual one, rather than being occupied by some dominant body, individual, concept or value. [...] Therefore syn-integral bridging does not follow the ideas of a metaphysical harmony, nor an underlying unity-oriented ideal(ism). Rather, it embraces demands of diversity, complexities, intricacies and ambiguities of bounded organizational realities" (128).

 

Note that they reference Lakoff and Johnson's work, particularly footnote 7 and its referenced text (121-22) on image schema and primary metaphor.

 

Responding to my own inquiry above about Edwards using the holon lens to scaffold the other lenses, in rereading Philosophy in the Flesh it turns out that our basic level categories and actions, those with which we directly interact with the world, depend on gestalt (part-whole) structure. Mental imagery (image schema) are also based on this gestalt perception. So it seems that the container image schema (holon), while only one of several different schemas, is fundamental in the sense above.

 

And yet Lakoff said this about set theory, which is built at least in part on the container schema:

 

"The same is true of set theory. There are lots and lots of set theories, each defined by different axioms. You can construct a set theory in which the Continuum hypothesis is true and a set theory in which it is false. You can construct a set theory in which sets cannot be members of themselves and a set theory in which sets can be members of themselves. It is just a matter of which axioms you choose, and each collection of axioms defines a different subject matter. Yet each such subject matter is itself a viable and self-consistent form of mathematics. [...] There is no one true set theory." (WMCF, 355).

 

They also explain why the above is not postmodern relativism: 

 

"In recognizing all the ways that mathematics makes use of cognitive universals and universal aspects of experience, the theory of embodied mathematics explicitly rejects any possible claim that mathematics is arbitrarily shaped by history and culture alone. Indeed, the embodiment of mathematics accounts for real properties of mathematics that a radical cultural relativism would deny or ignore: conceptual stability, stability of inference, precision, consistency, generalizability, discoverability, calculability, and real utility in describing the world" (362).

 

In chapter 2 of Sattler's book, Wilber's AQAL Model and Beyond, he reiterates a point I've long made in the "Real and false reason thread" regarding set theories: Some sets are fuzzy, meaning a member can be both partially in and out of a defined set. Hence a part is not completely subsumed in a larger holon as in the typical nested concentric circles. One kind of set theory does that, another kind (fuzzy set) does not. The former nested set forms one kind of hierarchy, the fuzzy kind form what I've come to call hier(an)archical synplexity. Both are internally consistent depending on which set axioms you choose, yet both are inconsistent with each other. Then again, which set axioms are more consistent with cognitive science given its own methodological axioms?

 

And here's an Integral World Sattler article. 

 

Then again, which set axioms are more consistent with cognitive science given its own methodological axioms? It depends on which cogsci you use. The 1st generation is built on what Lakoff calls the necessary and sufficient categorical conditions of disembodied, abstract reason. The 2nd generation is built on the fuzzy categories of embodied reason. The question becomes which is more empirically accurate given advances in the field?

 

In the above referenced Edwards book he discussed 3 different kinds of holarchy: developmental, ecological and governance (132). This might or not refer to different kinds of set theory. E.g.: "In true governance holarchies, more encompassing levels do not determine what the less encompassing levels will do in isolation from the organising agency of those junior levels. Higher holarchical levels do not cause lower levels to behave or think. The exchange is always a two-way process. Hence, in a balanced governance holarchy, constituent holons are best seen as leader-followers" (133).

 

Note the diagrams of the 3 types (figure 7.1). The governance holarchical levels are not subsumed within the higher levels, indicating a different set relationship.

 

Which of course reminds me of Bryant's discussion* of intension and extension relationships in Badiou's set theory. In the former the elements of the set are ordered in a particular way, whereas in the latter the elements can be related in multiple ways. I.e., elements in the latter are not defined by their relations whereas they are in the former. This seems to be the difference between the internal organizational structure of an individual holon and its relationships with other, external holons, similar to Edwards' different types.

 

Edwards gets at this from his own angle via his four orders of holonic relations: Intra, inter, systemic and inter-systemic (189-90). Intra-holonic order is the dynamics within an individual holon, often the focus of developmentalists. Inter-holonic order is the mediational dynamics between holons, often the study of constructionists. The systemic order is the relationship between holons and the holarchy in which it is embedded. He uses the governance holarchy as an example of this. Inter-systemic order is multi-lens frameworks "which consider multiple systems of holons and holarchies in dynamic environments" (191). The latter sounds a lot like Lakoff et al's cogsci, both at least cross-paradigmatic approaches.

 

Note: Commons et al now have a new stage above that called meta-cross-paradigmatic. I'm honestly not that interested in the minutiae of all this stageism. What's next? Super-post-trans-meta-cross-what da fa? 

 

I was just rereading some of our Ning review of Bruce's Sophia Speaks, with plenty of material relevant to this thread:  

 

E.g.: The preposition acts like khora in that it is that withdrawn core that prepares the space-time for actual occasions and is coterminous with them, a la Whitehead. Hence I'm wondering if prepositions, while parts of language, aren't themselves something prelinguistic and which tie language back to that basic categorical embodiment via image schemata? If I'm right about prepositions being more akin to objet a than being an actualization or local manifestation of a particular paradigm, then they might be more of a meta-paradigmatic function.

 

And: In Shaviro's "essays and papers" section one can find chapter drafts from his book on Whitehead. This is interesting from chapter 2 on Whitehead's eternal objects:

 

"Eternal objects thus take on something of the role that universals...Platonic forms and ideas played in older metaphysical systems. But we have already seen that, for Whitehead, 'concrete particular fact' cannot simply 'be built up out of universals'; it is more the other way around. Universals...can and must be abstracted from 'things which are temporal.' But they cannot be conceived by themselves, in the absence of the empirical, temporal entities that they inform. Eternal objects, therefore, are neither a priori logical structures, nor Platonic essences, nor constitutive rational ideas" (18).

 

From Lakoff & Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, Chapter 1:

 

“For the sake of imposing sharp distinctions, we develop what might be called essence prototypes, which conceptualize categories as if they were sharply defined and minimally distinguished from one another. When we conceptualize categories in this way, we often envision them using a spatial metaphor, as if they were containers, with an interior, an exterior, and a boundary. When we conceptualize categories as containers, we also impose complex hierarchical systems on them, with some category-containers inside other category-containers. Conceptualizing categories as containers hides a great deal of category structure. It hides conceptual prototypes, the graded structures of categories, and the fuzziness of category boundaries.”

 

This is the crux of the AQAL developmental holarchy lens/metaphor, itself only one of a multitude of lenses/metaphors. Its inference structure indeed hides a great deal of other categorical structures discussed in the book. While this lens is useful and consistent within its own limited inferential structure, it is inconsistent with other equally valuable metaphorical inference structures. L&J make clear there is no one structure that is the foundation for the others. Hence the problem is that we take the holarchy lens to be THE defining context within which all others must be contextualized, often based on some metaphysical premise that it's the way reality itself is organized.

 

From Edwards' book in the first post:

 

"There is a danger, however, that when the conservative side of metatheory stops being flexible and creative, the situating of theories and lenses becomes a process of typing and categorization. The AQAL framework may be particularly prone to this problem because of the prescriptive manner in which it is used. The fundamental task of metatheorizing is not to be able to categorize theories within some preexisting, overarching framework but to ensure that the unique contributions of middle-range theories are accommodated with the metatheory" (208).

 

We can also conceptualize container schema differently, i.e., where a so-called smaller holon is not subsumed in a larger one but in which they share a space-between as Edwards calls it. It offers an entirely different approach to hierarchy because the interacting holons retain their autonomy. They structurally couple and create another holon altogether instead of one being subsumed or nested in the other. 

 

This is especially significant when you take into account basic categories, which are in the middle of typical taxonomic hierarchies. That is, a hierarchy does not start with the most particular type which is subsumed into the most general type. Those two abstract ends of the spectrum are literally tied together by the basic category in the middle, the most concrete and thus the most closely interactive with the world. Hence this hierarchy is in effect from the middle up and down so that the very nature of hierarchy is entirely different than the typical one. Hence hier(an)archical synplexity.

 

I discussed this at length and in depth in both the states/stages and real/false reason Ning threads.

 

See this post quoting Edwards on the holon between: Also see the following post.

 

More from Philosophy in the Flesh, chapter 7. It's relevant because much of developmental notions of hierarchy are based on set theory:

 

"Spatial relations concepts (image schemas), which fit visual scenes, are not characterizable in terms of set-theoretical structures. Motor concepts (verbs of bodily movement), which fit the body's motor schemas, cannot be characterized by set-theoretical models. Set-theoretical models simply do not have the kind of structure needed to fit visual scenes or motor schemas, since all they have in them are abstract entities, sets of those entities, and sets of those sets. These models have no structure appropriate to embodied meaning-no motor schemas, no visual or imagistic mechanisms, and no metaphor."

 

Lens categories graphic: