Some excerpts:
"Here we aim to clarify some empirical questions that have been raised,
and review evidence that the prefrontal and posterior regions support
dynamic global workspace functions, in agreement with several other
authors. Static, gross anatomical divisions are superseded by the
dynamical connectome of cortex."
"GW
dynamics suggests that conscious experiences reflect a flexible
'binding and broadcasting' function in the brain, which is able to
mobilize a large, distributed collection of specialized cortical
networks and processes that are not conscious by themselves."
"Many conscious events are both sensory and semantic. For example, a word
in this sentence has sensory properties, but it carries meaning in
precisely the same event. Words that are effortful to read and
understand also activate the prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex.
Words that involve visual motor actions like playing tennis, also
recruit motor regions of the cortex."
"Some authors seem to restrict the term 'consciousness' to sensory events
(Raccah et al, 2021). This is an overly narrow definition that excludes
numerous conscious experiences, such as feelings of effort,
interoceptive emotional feelings, conscious beliefs and ideas,
endogenous visual imagery, and inner speech."
"We believe that human conscious cognition inherently allows for both
conscious thought about the conscious stream, as well as unconscious
comments on the conscious stream.[...] The GW concept, in itself, enables metacognitive processes from
unconscious onlooking systems viewing the conscious flow in the global
workspace. GWT suggests the plausibility of both conscious and
unconscious metacognition. [...] Conscious metacognition, in which humans consciously think about their
own conscious experiences — editing a text like this is one obvious
example. Unconscious metacognition, where Unconscious
specialized processors monitor the conscious global workspace to
interrupt the conscious flow, or otherwise intervene if the unconscious 'critic' detects a serious problem."
"There are conscious experiences that minimize metacognition, namely
absorbed experiences, as in the case of 'flow' experiences and any other
total involvement with a dense flow of events. After an absorbed state,
it is generally difficult for people to remember metacognitive
judgments from the absorbed state (Csikszentmihalyi et al, 2017). It
seems as if 'deep absorption' minimizes the capacity for conscious
metacognition, which makes sense in light of the limited capacity
constraint. Absorption may drive out conscious metacognition. It is hard
to reflect about inaccessible contents that occurred during absorption.
However, during absorption it is entirely possible that unconscious
metacognition continues, which would be suggested by our ability during
absorption to be interrupted by an unexpected fire alarm, presumably
detected unconsciously."
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